LANDLORD-TENANT-REMEDIES-TENANT'S
DUCTION FOR REPAIR EXPENDITURES-Marini

RIGHT

TO

RENT DE-

v. Ireland, 56 N.J.

130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
The legal adage caveat emptor, once a safety zone for many sellers
under the common law, has lost much of its effect in recent years.
Legislation such as the Uniform Commercial Code has greatly reduced those areas where a seller may be relieved of liability by pleading caveat emptor. As a result of this de-emphasis of the "buyer beware" attitude, consumer protection has increased rapidly.1 Recently,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Marini v. Ireland,2 made another
dent in the shield of the seller by extending consumer protection to
the landlord-tenant relationship.
On June 25, 1969, the defendant, a tenant of the plaintiff, discovered a crack in the bathroom bowl, which caused a large amount
of water to accumulate on the floor of the bathroom. Defendant attempted to notify the plaintiff but was not able to contact him. Therefore, on June 27, defendant hired a plumber to repair the leak. This
repair, which cost $85.72, was paid for by the defendant, and when
the rent for July fell due, defendant sent plaintiff the difference along
with a copy of the repair bill and a receipt indicating payment.
Plaintiff refused to accept this partial payment and demanded the full
rent of $95 as established under the terms of the lease. Defendant refused to pay anything more than the $9.28 difference. Plaintiff then
started a summary dispossess action in the county district court, the
jurisdiction of that court in this matter being solely statutory. 3 At
the trial, the judge held that the case was purely legal in nature and
that equitable defenses were not permissible, i.e., the written terms
of the lease must control. Since there was no express covenant to repair contained in the lease, the trial judge ruled that plaintiff was
under no duty to repair, and consequently defendant was in default.
Plaintiff was given judgment for possession and defendant was or1 See 1 SMroN HALL L. REv. 208 (1970).
2 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (Supp. 1969) provides:
Any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a
1 or more years, of any houses, buildings, lands or tenements, and
undertenants or legal representatives of such tenant or lessee, may
from such premises by the county district court of the county within
premises are situated, in an action in the following cases:

year, or for
the assigns,
be removed
which such

(b) Where such person shall hold over after a default in the payment of rent,
pursuant to the agreement under which the premises are held.
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dered to pay the $85.72 withheld from the July rent plus the August
rent, which defendant had refused to pay because of the pending dispossess action.
On appeal, a stay of judgment was granted pending a hearing
scheduled for September 23, 1969. However, before the case could
4
be heard, the supreme court certified the case on its own motion.
The supreme court saw fit to consider the case at that point because
of the unique question of appealability presented in light of the
statute which restricts appeals of dispossess actions to questions of
jurisdiction.5
It was defendant's contention that the county district court could
only acquire jurisdiction if there was a default. This point was not
disputed. But defendant claimed that there was no default in payment
of rent because the $85.72 allegedly withheld was not owing. If there
was no default, in a sense a question of fact, there was no jurisdiction.
However, plaintiff argued that since defendant admitted not paying
the full amount due, there was a default, with the only issue being the
amount due, a meritorious issue which may not be appealed under
the statute. 6
The supreme court reasoned that a default is not merely rent
due and unpaid. A default exists only when rent is due, unpaid, and
owing.7 If the tenant does not owe the money allegedly withheld,
there is no default, and consequently the county district court's jurisdiction may be challenged." The question is whether a tenant may
See N.J.R. 2:12-1.
5 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (1952) provides:
Proceedings had by virtue of this article shall not be appealable except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The landlord, however, shall remain liable in
a civil action for unlawful proceedings under this article.
Generally, four facts must be alleged in order to vest the county district court with jurisdiction. The complaint (originally affidavits were used) must state that a landlord-tenant
relationship exists; that a default in payment of rent has allegedly occurred; that a
distraint is not an adequate remedy; and that three days written notice has been given
demanding payment or repossession. See Fowler v. Roe, 25 N.J.L. 549, 550 (Sup. Ct. 1856).
In Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. DeMarco, 35 N.J. 459, 464, 173 A.2d 270, 273 (1961)
the court stated:
The established principle is that the trial court [has] jurisdiction if there [is]
evidence from which it could find a statutory basis for removal. If that test is
met, the judgment must be affirmed even though it is otherwise infected with
error.
6 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (1952).
7 56 N.J. at 139, 265 A2d at 531.
8 In connection with the point that a default cannot exist if the money is not owing,
the court proceeded:
4
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disprove the alleged default by means of an equitable defense. The
trial court did not think so, and there was some precedent for its decision.9 The supreme court, however, ruled that equitable defenses
are proper subjects for consideration at the trial level. 10 Indeed, the
supreme court stated that when an equitable defense goes to the issue
of jurisdiction, refusal by the county district court to entertain the
defense is appealable and not in derogation of the statute." In so
holding, the court overruled Peters v. Kelly,' 2 which held that a defendant's evidence of faulty heating could not be heard in an effort
to justify refusal to pay rent.
Marini points out that a defendant may test the jurisdiction of
the county district court twice, once at the pleading level by challenging the sufficiency of the facts in the complaint, and finally after all
the evidence is in. If the plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence
to support the default alleged in the complaint, an attack on the
court's jurisdiction is in order, whether the reason be equitable or
legal.
It should be observed that in dispossess actions, according to
Marini, the jurisdictional issue and the merits of the case, although
separate in concept, are provable by the same evidence. Facts introduced by the defendant to show that there is no default serve a dual
purpose. If the trial court finds that a default does or does not exist,
the jurisdictional question as well as the factual issues are passed upon.
The court stated:
[O]ur cases have hewed a line separating the "jurisdictional" issue
from the meritorious issue ....

Whatever "jurisdiction" means in

Thus a tenant's evidence in substantiation of a defense that there is no default,
or that the default is not in the amount alleged by the landlord, is admissible on
the jurisdictional issue. (emphasis added)
56 N.J. at 139, 265 A.2d at 531. This latter defense would appear to contradict the court's
previous reasoning. Would not the county district court be recognizing that a default
exists if the defendant merely contends that the "default is not in the amount alleged
by the landlord"? Does Marini intend to imply that if a landlord's complaint alleged a
default in an amount larger than he is entitled to, he loses his jurisdictional basis for the
action?
9 Peters v. Kelly, 98 N.J. Super. 441, 237 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1968). This case recognized that tenants may face problems in getting a landlord to make repairs. However, the
court viewed the problem as one to be solved by the legislature.
10 Duncan v. Malcomb, 234 Ark. 146, 351 S.W.2d 419 (1961); Vineland Shopping
Center, Inc. v. DeMarco, 35 N.J. 459, 469, 173 A.2d 270, 275 (1961); see also Carteret
Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J. 116, 124, 228 A.2d 674, 678 (1967).
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (1952).
12 98 N.J. Super. 441, 237 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1968).
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other settings, here it uniquely connotes the existence of one of

the factual situations delineated in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53.13
Thus, Marini demonstrated that the restriction on appeal in
summary dispossess actions is no real obstacle to the tenant since the
evidence introduced on the merits will also affect the jurisdiction. It
would seem that Marini has rendered N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 ineffective to a large extent.
Under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 18-60,14 a case may be removed from
the county district court to the superior court if it is of "sufficient
importance." Once a case has been removed to superior court, there is
no longer any restriction as to which issues may be appealed. Marini
saw no logical reason why a case which has not been removed should
be treated differently than one which has. The court noted that this
statute provides no guidelines as to what is of "sufficient importance."
Since every case is "important" to the parties involved, the court
commented, all cases could be removed to superior court under the
statute. Thus, Marini implies that 2A:18-60, with its vague requirements, when read in conjunction with 2A:18-59, renders the latter
ineffective.' 5
Having held that equitable as well as legal defenses may be heard,
and that these defenses go to jurisdiction as well as to the merits of
the case, the court had to determine if the defendant had any right
to deduct the cost of the repairs from the rent. Was the defendant entitled, under the lease, to have these repairs done by the landlord?
Historically, a lease was considered in the same class as a sale of
an interest in real estate in that the buyer was given no warranties of
any kind. Once a grantee accepted a deed, caveat emptor controlled. 16
Now, a lease of premises for residential purposes contains a covenant
that the premises are habitable, and this covenant may be implied as
13 56 N.J. at 138-39, 265 A.2d at 530 (citing Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. DeMarco, 35 N.J. at 464, 173 A.2d at 273 (1961)).
14 The statute provides:
At any time before an action for the removal of a tenant comes on for trial,
either the landlord or person in possession may apply to the superior court,
which may, if it deems it of sufficient importance, order the cause transferred
from the county district court to the superior court.
15 See Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 404, 261 A.2d 414, 417 (L.
Div. 1970) for an example of the court's treatment of a request to transfer under N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-60 (1952).

16 Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 382, 140 A.2d 199, 201 (1958); see
Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co., 24 N.J. 139, 145, 130 A.2d 833, 837 (1957).
These cases recognize the old common law principle but consider that attitude to be outmoded and unfair.
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well as expressed.1 7 Further, leases now tend to be construed as contracts,' 8 and under contract law the intentions of the parties will be
looked at to determine the meaning. x9 Applying these concepts to the
case at hand, Marini held that the landlord was obliged to make
"vital" repairs, even though the lease did not contain an express covenant to repair. It has been held that a covenant to repair must be
expressly contained in a lease. 20 Marini has broken with that line of
thought by permitting such a covenant to be implied. 21 As the court
stated:
A covenant in a lease can arise only by necessary implication
from specific language of the lease or because it is indispensable
to carry into effect the purpose of the lease. In determining, under
contract law, what covenants are implied, the object which the parties had in view and intended to be accomplished, is of primary
importance. 22
The court also noted that covenants should not be implied simply
because they are just and reasonable, but rather because the parties
must have intended them. 23 In connection with this the court stated:
17 Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967); Reste Realty
Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). In Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590,
596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961) the court stated:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would
• . . be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this
era of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor. Permitting landlords to rent "tumbledown"
houses is at least a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile
delinquency and high property taxes for conscientious landowners.
18 See 3 G. THoMPsoN ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 1110-12 at 377-88 (1959 Replacement by
J. Grimes).
19 La Freda v. Woodward, 125 N.J.L. 489, 15 A.2d 798 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940); Ready
v. Texaco, Inc., 410 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1966). La Freda, although recognizing that leases are
contracts with the parties' intentions to be considered, is a good example of the gradual
liberalization in permitting implied covenants. Earlier courts were not inflexible against
finding implied covenants in leases, but they were very strict. Today, as in Marini, courts
tend to construe leases in a light more favorable to the tenant. See Reste Realty Corp. v.
Cooper, 53 N.J. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272 (1969).
20 Rene's Restaurant Corp. v. Fro-Du-Co Corp., 137 Ind. App. 559, 210 N.E.2d 385
(1965); McCrory Corp. v. Nacol, 428 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Goldstein v. Corrigan, 405 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
21 Covenants to repair have been implied where certain express covenants in the lease
provide clear evidence that the covenant to repair must have been implicit; for example,
a covenant which reserves to the landlord the right to enter to make repairs upon the
premises and provides that the tenant may not obtain an abatement or diminution of
rent by making repairs. Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958).
22 56 N.J. at 143, 265 A.2d at 533.
23 Id. However, Marini tends to relax the requirement beyond its own preaching. In
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In a modern setting, the landlord should, in residential letting, be
held to an implied covenant against latent defects, which is another
manner of saying, habitability and livability fitness .... It is a mere
matter of semantics whether we designate this covenant one "to
repair" or "of habitability and livability fitness." 24
Thus, Marini has stripped away the rhetoric or technicalities which
may have prevented other courts from holding a landlord responsible
for repairs under an implied covenant.
It is important to note that the supreme court, in ruling on
Marini, confined its opinion so as to apply only to those particular
fact situations where the lease is for residential purposes and the repairs are such that failure to repair would render the demised
premises uninhabitable.2 5 Implied warranties to repair have not been
confined to residential letting only. In Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,28
the supreme court found that an implied covenant to repair can exist
under a lease of commercial offices, but in that case constructive eviction was the defense to abandonment of the premises, not a defense
to justify deducting the cost of repairs from rent due. The requirement in Marini that the repairs must be vital and essential to habitability is a valid determination. However, future litigation based on
Marini will find it necessary to determine just what is and what is
not a "vital" repair, and that may not be easy. For example, is new
paint on an old or cracked wall a vital repair? How about replacement of a bedroom doorknob or a broken window? These repairs
may be necessary, but can they be considered vital within the mean27
ing of Marini?
Allowing repair costs to be deducted from rent due is not a novel
policy per se. It has been allowed where there was an express covenant
to repair. 2 The tenant had a choice of remedy, either vacate, or rereality, the court is finding an implication which the plaintiff did not wish to imply, but
rather what the court feels he should have intended to imply.
24 56 N.J. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.
25 See Smith v. M.P.W. Realty Co., 423 Pa. 536, 225 A.2d 227 (1967), which states that
a landlord does not ordinarily warrant that the premises are tenantable. However, the
court concedes that this general proposition is relaxed when the needed repairs are for
facilities within the control of the landlord, such as heating and plumbing. (Is a bathroom bowl within the control of the landlord?)
26 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
27 See Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex Cty.
Dist. Ct. 1970).
28 Cases cited note 20 supra. These cases recognize the right of a tenant to deduct
repair costs from the rent, provided there is an express covenant to repair. These cases
probably would not permit an abatement or setoff under an implied warranty. See also
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pair the premises and then sue the landlord for the repair costs. In
Marini, the court went one step further by allowing a tenant the
opportunity to recover repair costs under an implied covenant to repair.29 Grasping the reality of the situation, the court stated:
It is of little comfort to a tenant in these days of housing
shortage to accord him the right, upon a constructive eviction, to
vacate the premises .... Rather he should be accorded the alternative remedy of terminating the cause of the constructive eviction
* .,. . This latter course of action is accompanied by the right to
offset the cost of such repairs as are reasonable .... 30
A collateral point considered in Marini is whether the obligations of a lease are dependent or independent of each other. There is
much authority for the proposition that covenants in a lease are generally independent, and a breach by one party only creates a right to
sue on that breach.3 1 However, there is also authority for the contractual approach that covenants are either dependent or independent
according to the intentions of the parties. 32 It is a case by case consideration. 33 Marini follows this latter philosophy and holds that
Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945); Hosang v.
Minor, 205 Cal. App. 2d 269, 22 Cal. Rptr. 794 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
29 If . . . a landlord fails to make the repairs and replacements of vital facilities
necessary to maintain the premises in a livable condition ... the tenant may cause
This does not
the same to be done and deduct the cost ... from future rents ....
mean that the tenant is relieved from the payment of rent so long as the landlord
fails to repair.The tenant has only the alternative remedies of making the repairs
or removing from the premises upon such a constructive eviction. (emphasis
added)
56 N.J. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535. Consider the recent case of Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown,
111 N.J. Super. 447, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex Cty. Dist. Ct. 1970) in light of the above quote.
Relying on Marini, Academy Spires allowed the defendant-tenant a 25% abatement in
rent as just compensation for the plaintiff-landlord's failure to supply heat, hot water and
elevator service. Defendant deliberately withheld three months rent because of the landlord's failure to perform in accordance with the terms of the lease. Taking Marini one
step further, Academy Spires held that the defendant was not obliged to make the repairs
himself under the circumstances. The court ruled that in situations where a single tenant
or a few tenants in a multiple dwelling must, out of necessity, rely on the landlord to
make certain repairs, they would be entitled to a diminution of rent as damages resulting
from the landlord's failure to perform. Such a ruling, if upheld by a higher court, might
take the tenant self-help philosophy of Marini to a dangerous extreme.
80 56 N.J. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
31 Bolon v. Pennington, 6 Ariz. App. 308, 432 P.2d 274 (1967); Goldsmith v. Tub-OWash, 199 Cal. App. 2d 132, 18 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Ready v. Texaco,
Inc., 410 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1966).
52 Medico-Dental Building Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457
(1942); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
33 Higgins v. Whiting, 102 N.J.L. 279, 280, 131 A. 879, 880 (Sup. Ct. 1926):
[I]t is said that covenants are to be construed as dependent or independent ac-
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where the parties intended that the premises be used as a residential
dwelling, they must also reasonably intend that certain covenants contained in the lease, express or implied, be dependent. In Alexander's
Department Stores, Inc. v. Arnold Constable Corp.,34 the court stated
that there is necessarily a mutual covenant, whether express or implied, of extreme good faith by each party, both as to interpretation
and performance of the lease agreement. It would appear that Marini
is correct in deciding that the tenant is entitled to withhold rent if
the landlord fails to perform a covenant so vital as to affect the health
and welfare of his tenant. If for no other reason than that stated in
the above quote (i.e., the housing shortage), covenants of this nature
should be considered dependent, notwithstanding cases such as Bell v.
Kemp, 35 which held that payment of rent is a condition, not a covenant. Moreover, Reste's holding that breach of any dependent covenant is to be deemed failure of consideration 36 is further justification
for allowing a tenant to withhold payment of rent.
Marini has done much to increase the tenant's lawful remedies
against disinterested landlords. It has given new dimension to the
scope of review under 2A:18-59 by expanding the area covered by
"jurisdiction." It has firmly established the permissibility of equitable
defenses to dispossess actions. It has permitted covenants to repair to
be implied-a most significant development. It confirms the right of
a tenant to make reasonable repairs and deduct the cost from rent by
construing covenants to be dependent. However, the court is careful to
point out that it does not wish to stifle reasonable dispossess actions,
nor does it seek to place the landlord at a distinct disadvantage. The
court suggests that whenever a dispossess action is delayed, the tenant
be required to deposit the full amount of unpaid rent so as to protect
cording to the intention and meaning of the parties and the good sense of the
case. Technical words should give way to such intentions.
In the present case, the covenant to pay rent and the covenant to heat the
apartment are mutual and dependent.
Contra, Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945).
See also Marcus v. Great American Tea Co., 61 R.I. 238, 200 A. 534 (1938), which also
held that a tenant may be entitled to an abatement in the amount he is injured by the
landlord's breach. But see Reporting Corp. v. Deshere, 4 N.J. Misc. 65, 131 A. 635 (Sup.
Ct. 1926), which held that a tenant in possession may not set up constructive eviction, nor
may he withhold rent because the landlord may have breached the covenant. Marini and
Reste appear to have overruled this latter case.
34 105 N.J. Super. 14, 25, 250 A.2d 792, 798 (Ch. 1969).
35 419 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1967); accord, Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co.,
59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945).
36 See also Groh v. Koner's Bull Pen, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 2d 611, 34 Cal. Rptr. 637
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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the landlord if he should prevail.3 7 In addition, an application for
stay of judgment pending appeal should not be granted as a matter
of course, but only after careful consideration.3 8 Marini is a wellreasoned, well-researched opinion which will hopefully stir other jurisdictions to reevaluate their tenant remedies.
Robert A. Marks
37 New York has enacted into law what Marini recommends to its lower courts.
N.Y. REAL PROP. AcrIoNs LAw § 755 (McKinney 1963) requires all tenants to deposit the
full amount of rent allegedly in default before any stay of judgment may be had.
38 56 N.J. at 147, 265 A.2d at 535.

